In re Damion B., 2012 (First Dist., Div. Two)
The reviewing court affirmed the orders of the juvenile court which denied the request of the de facto parents of twin boys the opportunity to present evidence through the examination of witnesses at the 18-month review hearing. (In re Damion B., No. A131039, slip op. at 11-12 (Cal.App.4th, Jan. 11, 2012)). The de facto parents opposed the recommendation of the agency to return the boys to their Mother. (Id. at 3). The Court found that counsel for appellants could not explain what evidence would be presented through the testimony that would be anything different than the evidence already submitted to the Court through the Caregiver Information Forms. (Id. at 10-11). Thus, the Court held that allowing the de facto parents to examine witnesses to bolster their position would be irrelevant and cumulative evidence pursuant to Evidence Code Section 352. (Id. at 12).
In re Joey G. (Fourth Dist., Div. One)
The juvenile court erred when it failed to obtain and consider a joint report pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 241.1 and make a determination as to whether the status of ward or dependent would best serve the minor's interests.
In re Lana S. (Fourth Dist., Div. One)
A court may properly deny family reunification services to a parent when parental rights have been terminated in earlier proceedings involving a sibling or half-sibling and the parent has not subsequently made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to removal, even though those problems are not alleged in the current dependency petitions.
In re A.G. (Fourth Dist., Div. One)
The trial court properly denied reunification services to a Father under Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7), because the Father's sexual abuse of his daughter indicates that he poses a danger to his sons by creating a dysfunctional and potentially dangerous environment.
In re Ethan C. (Supreme Court)
Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 300, subdivision (f) allows the juvenile court to adjudicate a child a dependent of the court where a parent’s fatal negligence which presents a risk of harm to surviving children in the custody of the parent, if the court finds that want of ordinary care by the child’s parent caused another child’s death. Further, an accident is not a superseding cause of death because the negligence of the parent was a substantial contributing cause of the child’s death in an ensuing traffic accident.
In re R.V. (Fourth Dist., Div. One)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling that the Father’s sexual abuse of his daughter left the son at substantial risk of sexual abuse by the Father, as well.
Tracy J. v. Superior Court (San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency), 2012 (Fourth Dist., Div. One)
The reviewing court reversed the orders of the juvenile court which terminated family reunification services to the parents, who were both developmentally disabled, and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26. (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency), No. D060252, slip op. at 14, 17 (Cal.App.4th, Jan. 26, 2012)). The appellate court did not find substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that returning the child to the custody of the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the Minor. (Id. at 11-12). The court further held that family reunification services provided to the parents were unreasonable because the services provided by the agency were not tailored to the developmental limitations of the parents. (Id. at 15-16). As a result, the appellate court directed the juvenile court to continue the 18-month review hearing for six months, expand the parent’s visitation with the Minor, and provide services that would be responsive to the needs of the parents. (Id. at 18).
In re Michael G. 2012, (Fourth Dist., Div. One)
The reviewing court held that although the juvenile court erred when it did not allow a continuance under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26 to allow time to receive evidence of a psychological evaluation of the Minor for purposes of determining adoptability, the mistake constituted harmless error because there existed substantial evidence before the Court to make a finding that the child was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time if parental rights were terminated. (In re Michael G. No. D060107, slip op. at 17 (Cal.App.4th, Feb. 14, 2012)).
In re Ashton R., 2012 (First Dist., Div. Five)
The appellate court reversed an order of the juvenile court after finding the trial court did not have the authority to order supervised visitation between the two minor siblings where it had dismissed one of the dependency petitions without a finding of jurisdiction.(In re Ashton R. No. A131535, slip op. at 15-16 (Cal.App.4th, Feb. 27, 2012)).
In re Jordan R.2012, (Fourth Dist., Div. One)
The juvenile court did not err when it precluded the Father from introducing the results of a polygraph examination in which the examiner concluded that the Father was truthful when he denied that he had sexually abused his niece because the polygraph examination evidence was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
In re A.S. (2012), (Fourth Dist., Div. Three)
The juvenile court did not err when it placed siblings in separate foster care placements. The court reasoned the children's options for permanent placement increased with separation because of the disruptive behavioral patterns of the minors.